We consider the problem of efficiently proving the integrity of data stored at untrusted servers. In the provable data possession (PDP) model, the client preprocesses the data and then sends it to an untrusted server for storage, while keeping a small amount of metadata. The client later asks the server to prove that the stored data has not been tampered with or deleted (without downloading the actual data). However, the original PDP scheme applies only to static (or append-only) files.
INTRODUCTION
In cloud storage systems, the server (or peer) that stores the client's data is not necessarily trusted. Therefore, users would like to check if their data has been tampered with or deleted. However, it is inefficient for the client to download all stored data in order to validate its integrity, even when using authenticated data structures solutions [31] .
Ateniese et al. [2] have formalized a model called provable data possession (PDP) . In this model, data (often represented as a file F ) is preprocessed by the client, and metadata used for verification purposes is produced. The file is then sent to an untrusted server for storage, and the client may delete the local copy of the file. The client keeps some (possibly secret) information to check server's responses later. The server proves the data has not been tampered with by responding to challenges sent by the client. The authors present several variations of their scheme under different cryptographic assumptions. These schemes provide probabilistic guarantees of possession, where the client checks a random subset of stored blocks with each challenge.
However, PDP and related schemes [2, 7, 13, 30] apply only to the case of static, archival storage, i.e., a file that is outsourced and never changes (simultaneously with our work, Ateniese et al. [3] present a scheme with somewhat limited dynamism, which is discussed in detail in the related work section). While the static model fits some application scenarios (e.g., libraries and scientific datasets), it is crucial to consider the dynamic case, where the client updates the outsourced data-by inserting, modifying, or deleting stored blocks or files-while maintaining data possession guarantees. Such a dynamic PDP scheme is essential in practical cloud computing systems for file storage [14, 17] , database services [18] , and peer-to-peer storage [15, 19] .
In this paper, we introduce a framework and efficient constructions for dynamic provable data possession (DPDP), which extends the PDP model to support provable updates on the stored data. Given a file F consisting of n blocks, we define an update as either insertion of a new block (anywhere in the file, not only append), or modification of an existing block, or deletion of any block. Therefore our update operation describes the most general form of modifications a client may wish to perform on a file.
Our DPDP solution is based on a new variant of authenticated dictionaries, where we use rank information to organize dictionary entries. Thus we are able to support efficient authenticated operations on files at the block level, such as authenticated insert and delete. We prove the security of our constructions using standard assumptions.
We also show how to extend our construction to support data possession guarantees of a hierarchical file system as well as file data itself. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first construc- [3] ; our scheme based on authenticated skip lists (DPDP I); and our scheme based on RSA trees (DPDP II). A star (*) indicates that a certain operation can be performed only a limited (pre-determined) number of times. We denote with n the number of the blocks of the file, with f the fraction of the corrupted blocks, and with C a constant, i.e., independent of n. In all constructions, the storage space is O(1) at the client and O(n) at the server.
tion of a provable storage system that enables efficient proofs of a whole file system, enabling verification at different levels for different users (e.g., every user can verify her own home directory) and at the same time not having to download the whole data (as opposed to [11] ). Our scheme yields a provable outsourced versioning system (e.g., CVS), which is evaluated in Section 8 by using traces of CVS repositories of three well-known projects.
Contributions
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows: (1) We introduce a formal framework for dynamic provable data possession (DPDP); (2) We provide the first efficient fully dynamic PDP solution; (3) We present a rank-based authenticated dictionary built over a skip list. This construction yields a DPDP scheme with logarithmic computation and communication and the same detection probability as the original PDP scheme (DPDP I); (4) We give an alternative construction (Section 6) of a rank-based authenticated dictionary using an RSA tree [25] . This construction results in a DPDP scheme with improved detection probability but higher server computation (DPDP II); (5) We present practical applications of our DPDP constructions to outsourced file systems and versioning systems (e.g., CVS, with variable block size support); (6) We perform an experimental evaluation of our skip list-based scheme. Now, we outline the performance of our schemes. Denote with n the number of blocks. The server computation, i.e., the time taken by the server to process an update or to compute a proof for a block, is O(log n) for DPDP I and O(n ǫ log n) for DPDP II; the client computation, i.e., the time taken by the client to verify a proof returned by the server, is O(log n) for both schemes; the communication complexity, i.e., the size of the proof returned by the server to the client, is O(log n) for both schemes; the client storage, i.e., the size of the meta-data stored locally by the client, is O(1) for both schemes; finally, the probability of detection, i.e., the probability of detecting server misbehavior, is 1 − (1 − f ) C for DPDP I and 1 − (1 − f ) Ω(log n) for DPDP II, for fixed logarithmic communication complexity, where f is the ratio of corrupted blocks and C is a constant, i.e., independent of n.
We observe that for DPDP I, we could use a dynamic Merkle tree (e.g., [16, 20] ) instead of a skip list to achieve the same asymptotic performance. We have chosen the skip list due to its simple implementation and the fact that algorithms for updates in the two-party model (where clients can access only a logarithmic-sized portion of the data structure) have been previously studied in detail for authenticated skip lists [24] but not for Merkle trees.
Related work
The PDP scheme by Ateniese et al. [2] provides an optimal protocol for the static case that achieves O(1) costs for all the complexity measures listed above. They review previous work on protocols fitting their model, but find these approaches lacking: either they require expensive server computation or communication over the entire file [10, 22] , linear storage for the client [29] , or do not provide security guarantees for data possession [28] . Note that using [2] in a dynamic scenario is insecure due to replay attacks. As observed in [8] , in order to avoid replay attacks, an authenticated tree structure that incurs logarithmic costs must be employed and thus constant costs are not feasible in a dynamic scenario.
Juels and Kaliski present proofs of retrievability (PORs) [13] , focusing on static archival storage of large files. Their scheme's effectiveness rests largely on preprocessing steps the client conducts before sending a file F to the server: "sentinel" blocks are randomly inserted to detect corruption, F is encrypted to hide these sentinels, and error-correcting codes are used to recover from corruption. As expected, the error-correcting codes improve the errorresiliency of their system. Unfortunately, these operations prevent any efficient extension to support updates, beyond simply replacing F with a new file F ′ . Furthermore, the number of queries a client can perform is limited, and fixed a priori. Shacham and Waters have an improved version of this protocol called Compact POR [30] , but their solution is also static (see [7] for a summary of POR schemes and related trade-offs).
Simultaneously with our work, Ateniese et al. have developed a dynamic PDP solution called Scalable PDP [3] . Their idea is to come up with all future challenges during setup and store precomputed answers as metadata (at the client, or at the server in an authenticated and encrypted manner). Because of this approach, the number of updates and challenges a client can perform is limited and fixed a priori. Also, one cannot perform block insertions anywhere (only append-type insertions are possible). Furthermore, each update requires re-creating all the remaining challenges, which is problematic for large files. Under these limitations (otherwise the lower bound of [8] would be violated), they provide a protocol with optimal asymptotic complexity O(1) in all complexity measures giving the same probabilistic guarantees as our scheme. Lastly, their work is in the random oracle model whereas our scheme is provably secure in the standard model (see Table 1 for full comparison).
Finally, our work is closely related to memory checking, for which lower bounds are presented in [8, 21] . Specifically, in [8] it is proved that all non-adaptive and deterministic checkers have read and write query complexity summing up to Ω(log n/ log log n) (necessary for sublinear client storage), justifying the O(log n) cost in our scheme. Note that for schemes based on cryptographic hashing, an Ω(log n) lower bound on the proof size has been shown [6, 32] . Related bounds for other primitives have been shown by Blum et al. [4] .
MODEL
We build on the PDP definitions from [2] . We begin by introducing a general DPDP scheme and then show how the original PDP model is consistent with this definition. We assume there is a hidden input and output clientstate in all functions run by the client, and serverstate in all functions run by the server. Some inputs and outputs may be empty in some schemes. For example, the PDP scheme of [2] does not store any metadata at the client side. Also sk, pk can be used for storing multiple files, possibly on different servers. All these functions can be assumed to take some public parameters as an extra input if operating in the public parameters model, although our construction does not require such modifications. Apart from {accept, reject}, algorithm VerifyUpdate can also output a new client metadata Mc. In most scenarios, this new metadata will be set as
DEFINITION 1 (DPDP SCHEME
Retrieval of a (part of a) file is similar to the challenge-response protocol above, composed of Challenge, Verify, Prove algorithms, except that along with the proof, the server also sends the requested (part of the) file, and the verification algorithm must use this (part of the) file in the verification process. We also note that a PDP scheme is consistent with the DPDP scheme definition, with algorithms PrepareUpdate, PerformUpdate and VerifyUpdate specifying an update that is a full re-write (or append).
As stated above, PDP is a restricted case of DPDP. The PDP scheme of [2] has the same algorithm definition for key generation, defines a restricted version of PrepareUpdate that can create the metadata for only one block at a time, and defines Prove and Verify algorithms similar to our definition. It lacks an explicit definition of Challenge (though one is very easy to infer). PerformUpdate consists of performing a full re-write or an append (so that replay attacks can be avoided), and VerifyUpdate is used accordingly, i.e., it always accepts in case of a full re-write or it is run as in DPDP in case of an append. It is clear that our definition allows a broad range of DPDP (and PDP) schemes.
We now define the security of a DPDP scheme, inspired by the security definitions of [2, 7] . Note that the restriction to the PDP scheme gives a security definition for PDP schemes compatible with the ones in [2, 3] .
DEFINITION 2 (SECURITY OF DPDP). We say that a DPDP scheme is secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary who can win the following data possession game with nonnegligible probability, there exists an extractor that can extract (at least) the challenged parts of the file by resetting and challenging the adversary polynomially many times.
DATA POSSESSION GAME: Played between the challenger who plays the role of the client and the adversary who acts as a server. Note that our definition coincides with extractor definitions in proofs of knowledge. For an adversary that answers a nonnegligible fraction of the challenges, a polynomial-time extractor must exist. Furthermore, this definition can be applied to the POR case [7, 13, 30] , in which by repeating the challenge-response process, the extractor can extract the whole file with the help of errorcorrecting codes. The probability of catching a cheating server is analyzed in Section 5.
KEYGEN: The challenger runs
Finally, if a DPDP scheme is to be truly publicly verifiable, the Verify algorithm should not make use of the secret key. Since that is the case for our construction (see Section 4), we can derive a public verifiability protocol usable for official arbitration purposes; this work is currently under development.
RANK-BASED SKIP LISTS
In order to implement our first DPDP construction, we develop a modification of the authenticated skip list data structure [12] , which we call a rank-based authenticated skip list. A similar modification could be done on other hash-based authenticated data structures, such as Merkle trees.
We recall that in a skip list [26] , each node v stores two pointers, denoted rgt(v) and dwn(v), that are used for searching. In an authenticated skip list [12] , a node v also stores a label f (v) computed by applying a collision-resistant hash function to f (rgt(v)) and f (dwn(v)).
We can use an authenticated skip list to check the integrity of the file blocks. However, this data structure does not support efficient verification of the indices of the blocks, which are used as query and update parameters in our DPDP scenario. To overcome this difficulty, we define a new hashing scheme that takes into account rank information.
Authenticating ranks
Let F be a file consisting of n blocks m1, m2, . . . , mn. We store at the i-th bottom-level node of the skip list a representation T (mi) of block mi (we will define T (mi) later). Block mi will be stored elsewhere by the untrusted server. Each node v of the skip list stores the number of nodes at the bottom level that can be reached from v. We call this value the rank of v and denote it with r(v). In Figure 1 , we show the ranks of the nodes of a skip list. An insertion, deletion, or modification of a file block affects only the nodes of the skip list along a search path. We can recompute bottom-up the ranks of the affected nodes in constant time per node. The top leftmost node of a skip list will be referred to as the start node. For example, w7 is the start node of the skip list in Figure 1 . For a node v, denote with low(v) and high(v) the indices of the leftmost and rightmost nodes at the bottom level reachable from v, respectively. Clearly, for the start node s of the skip list, we have r(s) = n, low(s) = 1 and high(s) = n. Using the ranks stored at the nodes, we can reach the i-th node of the bottom level by traversing a path that begins at the start node, as follows. For the current node v, assume we know low(v) and high(v). Let w = rgt(v) and z = dwn(v). We set
If i ∈ [low(w), high(w)], we follow the right pointer and set v = w, else we follow the down pointer and set v = z. We continue until we reach the i-th bottom node.
In order to authenticate skip lists with ranks, we extend the hashing scheme defined in [12] . We consider a skip list that stores data items at the bottom-level nodes. In our application, the node v associated with the i-th block mi stores item x(v) = T (mi). Let l(v) be the level (height) of node v in the skip list (l(v) = 0 for the nodes at the bottom level).
Let || denote concatenation. We extend a hash function h to support multiple arguments by defining
DEFINITION 3 (HASHING SCHEME WITH RANKS). Given a collision resistant hash function h, the label f (v) of a node v of a rank-based authenticated skip list is defined as follows.
Case 0: v = null f (v) = 0 ; Case 1: l(v) > 0 f (v) = h(l(v), r(v), f (dwn(v)), f (rgt(v))) ; Case 2: l(v) = 0 f (v) = h(l(v), r(v), x(v), f (rgt(v))) .
Queries
Suppose now the file F and a skip list on the file have been stored at the untrusted server. The client wants to verify the integrity of block i and therefore issues query atRank(i) to the server. The server executes Algorithm 1, described below, to compute T (i) and a proof for T (i) (for convenience we use T (i) to denote T (mi)).
Let v k , . . . , v1 be the path from the start node, v k , to the node associated with block i, v1. The reverse path v1, . . . , v k is called the verification path of block i. For each node vj, j = 1, . . . , k, we define boolean d(vj) and values q(vj) and g(vj) as follows, where we conventionally set r(null) = 0:
The proof for block i with data Table 2 . Due to the properties of skip lists, a proof has expected size O(log n) with high probability (whp).
Algorithm 1: (T , Π) = atRank(i)
1: Let v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k be the verification path for block i; 2: return representation T of block i and proof
Verification
After receiving from the server the representation T of block i and a proof Π for it, the client executes Algorithm 2 to verify the proof using the stored metadata Mc.
Algorithm 2 iteratively computes tuples (λj, ρj, δj, γj) for each node vj on the verification path plus a sequence of integers ξj. If the returned block representation T and proof Π are correct, at each iteration of the for-loop, the algorithm computes the following values associated with a node vj of the verification path:
• integer λj = l(vj), i.e., the level of vj;
• integer ρj = r(vj), i.e., the rank of vj;
• boolean δj, which indicates whether the previous node vj−1 is to the right or below vj;
• hash value γj = f (vj), i.e., the label of vj;
• integer ξj, which is equal to the sum of the ranks of all the nodes that are to the right of the nodes of the path seen so far, but are not on the path.
2: λ 0 = 0; ρ 0 = 1; γ 0 = T ; ξ 0 = 0; 3: for j = 1, . . . , k do 4: λ j = l j ; ρ j = ρ j−1 + q j ; δ j = d j ; 5: if δ j = rgt then 6:
7:
8: else {δ j = dwn} 9:
10: 
Updates
The possible updates in our DPDP scheme are insertions of a new block after a given block i, deletion of a block i, and modification of a block i.
To perform an update, the client issues first query atRank(i) (for an insertion or modification) or atRank(i − 1) (for a deletion), which returns the representation T of block i or i − 1 and its proof Π ′ . Also, for an insertion, the client decides the height of the tower of the skip list associated with the new block. Next, the client verifies proof Π
′ and computes what would be the label of the start node of the skip list after the update, using a variation of the technique of [24] . Finally, the client asks the server to perform the update on the skip list by sending to the server the parameters of the update (for an insertion, the parameters include the tower height).
We outline in Algorithm 3 the update algorithm performed by the server (performUpdate) and in Algorithm 4 the update algorithm performed by the client (verUpdate). Input parameters T ′ and Π ′ of verUpdate are provided by the server, as computed by performUpdate.
Since updates affect only nodes along a verification path, these algorithms run in expected O(log n) time whp and the expected size of the proof returned by performUpdate is O(log n) whp. 
Algorithm 3: (T ′
, Π ′ ) = performUpdate(i, T , upd) 1
DPDP SCHEME CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we present our DPDP I construction. First, we describe our algorithms for the procedures introduced in Definition 1. Next, we develop compact representatives for the blocks to improve efficiency (blockless verification). In the following, n is the current number of blocks of the file. The logarithmic complexity for most of the operations are due to well-known results about authenticated skip lists [12, 25] . Most of the material of this section also applies to the DPDP II scheme presented in Section 6.
Core construction
The server maintains the file and the metadata, consisting of an authenticated skip list with ranks storing the blocks. Thus, in this preliminary construction, we have T (b) = b for each block b. The client keeps a single hash value, called basis, which is the label of the start node of the skip list. We implement the DPDP algorithms as follows.
• KeyGen(1 k ) → {sk, pk}: Our scheme does not require any keys to be generated. So, this procedure's output is empty, and hence none of the other procedures make use of these keys;
• PrepareUpdate(sk, pk, F , info, Mc) → {e(F ), e(info), e(M )}:
This is a dummy procedure that outputs the file F and information info it receives as input.
Mc and e(M ) are empty (not used);
• PerformUpdate(pk, Fi−1, Mi−1, e(F ), e(info), e(M )) → {Fi, Mi, M . This corresponds to calling Algorithm 3 on inputs a block index j, the new data T (in case of an insertion or a modification) and the type of the update upd (all this information is included in e(info)). Note that the index j and the type of the update upd is taken from e(info) and the new data T is e(F ). • Challenge(sk, pk, Mc) → {c}: This procedure does not need any input apart from knowing the number of blocks in the file (n). It might additionally take a parameter C which is the number of blocks to challenge. The procedure creates C random block IDs between 1, . . . , n. This set of C random block IDs are sent to the server and is denoted with c. The runtime is O(C);
• Prove(pk, Fi, Mi, c) → {P }: This procedure uses the last version of the file Fi and the skip list Mi, and the challenge c sent by the client. It runs the skip list prover to create a proof on the challenged blocks. Namely, let i1, i2, . . . , iC be the indices of the challenged blocks. Prove calls Algorithm 1 C times (with arguments i1, i2, . . . , iC ) and sends back C proofs. All these C proofs form the output P . The runtime is O(C log n) whp;
• Verify(sk, pk, Mc, c, P ) → {accept, reject}: This function takes the last basis Mc the client has as input, the challenge c sent to the server, and the proof P received from the server. It then runs Algorithm 2 using as inputs the indices in c, the metadata Mc, the data T and the proof sent by the server (note that T and the proof are contained in P ). This outputs a new basis. If this basis matches Mc then the client accepts. Since this is performed for all the indices in c, this procedure takes O(C log n) expected time whp.
The above construction requires the client to download all the challenged blocks for the verification. A more efficient method for representing blocks is discussed in the next section.
Blockless verification
We can improve the efficiency of the core construction by employing homomorphic tags, as in [2] . However, the tags described here are simpler and more efficient to compute. Note that it is possible to use other homomorphic tags like BLS signatures [5] as in Compact POR [30] .
We represent a block b with its tag T (b). Tags are small in size compared to data blocks, which provides two main advantages. First, the skip list can be kept in memory. Second, instead of downloading the blocks, the client can just download the tags. The integrity of the tags themselves is protected by the skip list, while the tags protect the integrity of the blocks.
In order to use tags, we modify our KeyGen algorithm to output pk = (N, g), where N = pq is a product of two primes and g is an element of high order in Z * N . The public key pk is sent to the server; there is no secret key.
The tag T (b) of a block b is defined by
The skip list now stores the tags of the blocks at the bottom-level nodes. Therefore, the proofs provided by the server certify the tags instead of the blocks themselves. Note that instead of storing the tags explicitly, the server can alternatively compute them as needed from the public key and the blocks. The Prove procedure computes a proof for the tags of the challenged blocks mi j (1 ≤ i1, . . . , iC ≤ n denote the challenged indices, where C is the number of challenged blocks and n is the total number of blocks). The server also sends a combined block M = P C j=1 ajmi j , where aj are random values sent by the client as part of the challenge. The size of this combined block is roughly the size of a single block. Thus, we have a much smaller overhead than for sending C blocks. Also, the Verify algorithm computes the value
and accepts if T = g M mod N and the skip list proof verifies. The Challenge procedure can also be made more efficient by using the ideas in [2] . First, instead of sending random values aj separately, the client can simply send a random key to a pseudorandom function that will generate those values. Second, a key to a pseudo-random permutation can be sent to select the indices of the challenged blocks 1 ≤ ij ≤ n (j = 1, . . . , C). The definitions of these pseudo-random families can be put into the public key. See [2] for more details on this challenge procedure. We can now outline our main result (for the proof of security see Section 5): Note that the above results hold in expectation and with high probability due to the properties of skip lists [26] .
SECURITY
In this section we, prove the security of our DPDP scheme. While our proof refers specifically to the DPDP I scheme, it also applies to the DPDP II scheme discussed in the next section. Indeed, the only difference between the two schemes is the authenticated structure used for protecting the integrity of the tags.
We begin with the following lemma, which follows from the two-party authenticated skip list construction (Theorem 1 of [24] ) and our discussion in Section 3. LEMMA 2. Assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function, the proofs generated using our rank-based authenticated skip list guarantees the integrity of its leaves T (mi) with nonnegligible probability.
THEOREM 2 (SECURITY OF CORE DPDP PROTOCOL).
The DPDP protocol without tags is secure in the standard model according to Definition 2 and assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function.
Proof: (Sketch) Assume that the adversary wins the data possession game in Definition 2. Then, the challenger can either extract the challenged blocks (if the blocks have not been tampered with) or find a collision for the hash function (if the blocks have been tampered with). The challenger achieves this by means of two sub-entities: An extractor who extracts the challenged blocks from the adversary's proof, and a reductor who breaks the collision-resistance if the extractor fails to extract the original blocks since the reductor has access to the original blocks. 2
Next, we analyze our improved DPDP construction that uses tags. In this case, we need also the following standard assumption:
DEFINITION 4 (FACTORING ASSUMPTION). For all PPT adversaries
A and large-enough number N = pq which is a product of two primes p and q, the probability that A can output p or q given N is negligible in the size of p and q.
THEOREM 3 (SECURITY OF DPDP PROTOCOL WITH TAGS).

The DPDP protocol with tags is secure in the standard model according to Definition 2, assuming the existence of a collisionresistant hash function and that the factoring assumption holds.
Proof: (Sketch) Assume that the adversary wins the data possession game in Definition 2. Then, by using similar arguments as in Theorem 2, we can show that the challenger can either extract the challenged blocks, or break the collision-resistance of the hash function used, or break the factoring assumption. 2
For the full proofs of the above results, please refer to the extended version of the paper [9] .
Concerning the probability of detection, the client probes C blocks by calling the Challenge procedure. Clearly, if the server tampers with a block other than those probed, the server will not be caught. Assume now that the server tampers with t blocks. If the total number of blocks is n, the probability that at least one of the probed blocks matches at least one of the tampered blocks is 1 − ((n − t)/n) C , since choosing C of n − t non-tampered blocks has probability ((n − t)/n) C .
RANK-BASED RSA TREES
We now describe how we can use ideas from [25] to implement the DPDP II scheme (see Table 1 ), which has a higher probability of detection, maintains logarithmic communication complexity but has increased update time.
In [25] , a dynamic authenticated data structure called RSA tree is presented that achieves constant expected query time (i.e., time to construct the proof), constant proof size, and O(n ǫ log n) expected amortized update time, for a given 0 < ǫ < 1. We can add rank information to the RSA tree by explicitly storing ranks at the internal nodes. Using this data structure allows the server to answer O(log n) challenges with O(log n) communication cost since the proof for a block tag has O(1) size. The reason for sending additional challenges is the fact that the probability p of detection increases with number C of challenges, since p = 1 − (1 − f ) C , where f is the fraction of tampered blocks. Therefore, by using an RSA tree with ranks to implement DPDP, we obtain the same complexity measures as DPDP I, except for the update time, which increases from O(log n) to O(n ǫ log n) (expected amortized), and achieve an improved probability of detection equal to 1 − (1 − f ) Ω(log n) . Using the above provably secure authenticated data structure based on [25] to secure the tags (where security is based on the strong RSA assumption), we obtain the following result: 
The client space is O(1) and the server space is O(n).
Note that sending O(log n) challenges in [2, 3] or DPDP I would increase the communication complexity from O(1) to O(log n) and from O(log n) to O(log 2 n), respectively.
EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
Our DPDP scheme supports a variety of distributed data outsourcing applications where the data is subject to dynamic updates. In this section, we describe extensions of our basic scheme that employ additional layers of rank-based authenticated dictionaries to store hierarchical, application-specific metadata for use in networked storage and version control.
Variable-sized blocks
We now show how we can augment our hashing scheme to support variable-sized blocks (e.g., when we want to update a byte of a certain block). Recall that our ranking scheme assigns each internal node u a rank r(u) equivalent to the number of bottom-level nodes (data blocks) reachable from the subtree rooted at u; these nodes (blocks) are conventionally assigned a rank equal to 1. We support variable-sized blocks by defining the rank of a node at the bottom level to be the size of its associated block (i.e., in bytes). Each internal node, in turn, is assigned a rank equivalent to the amount of bytes reachable from it. Queries and proofs proceed the same as before, except that ranks and intervals associated with the search path refer to byte offsets, not block indices, with updates phrased as, e.g., "insert m bytes at byte offset i". Such an update would require changing only the block containing the data at byte index i. Similarly, modifications and deletions affect only those blocks spanned by the range of bytes specified in the update.
Directory hierarchies
We can also extend our DPDP scheme for use in storage systems consisting of multiple files within a directory hierarchy. The key idea is to place the start node of each file's rank-based authenticated structure (from our single-file scheme) at the bottom node of a parent dictionary used to map file names to files. Using key-based authenticated dictionaries [24] , we can chain our proofs and update operations through the entire directory hierarchy, where each directory is represented as an authenticated dictionary storing its files and subdirectories. Thus, we can use these authenticated dictionaries in a nested manner, with the start node of the topmost dictionary representing the root of the file system. This extension provides added flexibility for multi-user environments. Consider a system administrator who employs an untrusted storage provider. The administrator can keep the authenticated structure's metadata corresponding to the topmost directory, and use it to periodically check the integrity of the whole file system. Each user can keep the label of the start node of the dictionary corresponding to her home directory, and use it to independently check the integrity of her home file system at any time, without need for cooperation from the administrator.
Since the start node of the authenticated structure of the directory hierarchy is the bottom-level node of another authenticated structure at a higher level in the hierarchy, upper levels of the hierarchy must be updated with each update to the lower levels. Still, the proof complexity stays relatively low: For example, for the rankbased authenticated skip list case, if n is the maximum number of leaves in each skip list and the depth of the directory structure is d, then proofs on the whole file system have expected O(d log n) size and computation time whp.
Version control
We can build on our extensions further to efficiently support a versioning system (e.g., a CVS repository, or versioning filesystem). Such a system can be supported by adding another additional layer of key-based authenticated dictionaries [24] , keyed by revision number, between the dictionaries for each file's directory and its data, chaining proofs as in previous extensions. As before, the client needs only to store the topmost basis; thus we can support a versioning system for a single file with only O(1) storage at the client and O(log n + log v) proof complexity, where v is the number of the file versions. For a versioning system spanning multiple directories, let v be the number of versions and d be the depth of the directory hierarchy. The proof complexity for the versioning file system has expected size O(d(log n + log v)).
The server may implement its method of block storage independently from the dictionary structures used to authenticate data; it does not need to physically duplicate each block of data that appears in each new version. However, as described, this extension requires the addition of a new rank-based dictionary representing file data for each new revision added (since this dictionary is placed at the leaf of each file's version dictionary). In order to be more space-efficient, we could use persistent authenticated dictionaries [1] along with our rank mechanism. These structures handle updates by adding some new nodes along the update path, while preserving old internal nodes corresponding to previous versions of the structure, thus avoiding unneeded replication of nodes.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of our DPDP I scheme (Section 4.2) in terms of communication and computational overhead, in order to determine the price of dynamism over static PDP. For ease of comparison, our evaluation uses the same scenario as in PDP [2] , where a server wishes to prove possession of a 1GB file. As observed in [2] , detecting a 1% fraction of incorrect data with 99% confidence requires challenging a constant number of 460 blocks; we use the same number of challenges for comparison. 
Proof size
The expected size of proofs of possession for a 1GB file under different block sizes is illustrated in Figure 2(a) . Here, a DPDP proof consists of responses to 460 authenticated skip list queries, combined with a single verification block M = Σaimi, which grows linearly with the block size. The size of this block M is the same as that used by the PDP scheme in [2] , and is thus represented by the line labeled PDP. The distance between this line and those for our DPDP I scheme represents our communication overheadthe price of dynamism-which comes from the skip list query responses (illustrated in Table 2 ). Each response contains on average 1.5 log n rows, so the total size decreases exponentially (but slowly) with increasing block size, providing near-constant overhead except at very small block sizes.
Server computation
Next, we measure the computational overhead incurred by the server in answering challenges. Figure 2(b) presents the results of these experiments (averaged from 5 trials), which were performed on an AMD Athlon X2 3800+ system with 2GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM. As above, we compute the time required by our scheme for a 1GB file under varying block sizes, providing 99% confidence. As shown, our performance is dominated by computing M and increases linearly with the block size; note that static PDP [2] must also compute this M in response to the challenge. Thus the computational price of dynamism-time spent traversing the skip list and building proofs-while logarithmic in the number of blocks, is extremely low in practice: even for a 1GB file with a million blocks of size 1KB, computing the proof for 460 challenged blocks (achieving 99% confidence) requires less than 40ms in total (as small as 13ms with larger blocks). We found in other experiments that even when the server is not I/O bound (i.e., when computing M from memory) the computational cost was nearly the same. Note that any outsourced storage system proving the knowledge of the challenged blocks must reach those blocks and therefore pay the I/O cost, and therefore such a small overhead for such a huge file is more than acceptable.
The experiments suggest the choice of block size that minimizes total communication cost and computation overhead for a 1GB file: a block size of 16KB is best for 99% confidence, resulting in a proof size of 415KB, and computational overhead of 30ms. They also show that the price of dynamism is a small amount of overhead compared to the existing PDP scheme.
Version control
Finally, we evaluate an application that suits our scheme's ability to efficiently handle and prove updates to versioned, hierarchical resources. Public CVS repositories offer a useful benchmark to assess the performance of the version control system we describe in Section 7. Using CVS repositories for the Rsync [27] , Samba [27] and Tcl [23] projects, we retrieved the sequence of updates from the RCS source of each file in each repository's main branch. RCS updates come in two types: "insert m lines at line n" or "delete m lines starting at line n". Note that other partially-dynamic schemes (i.e., Scalable PDP [3] ) cannot handle these types of updates. For this evaluation, we consider a scenario where queries and proofs descend a search path through hierarchical authenticated dictionaries corresponding (in order) to the directory structure, history of versions for each file, and finally to the source-controlled lines of each file. We use variable-sized data blocks, but for simplicity, assume a naïve scheme where each line of a file is assigned its own block; a smarter block-allocation scheme that collects contiguous lines during updates would yield fewer blocks, resulting in less overhead. Table 3 : Authenticated CVS server characteristics. Table 3 presents performance characteristics of three public CVS repositories under our scheme; while we have not implemented an authenticated CVS system, we report the server overhead required for proofs of possession for each repository. Here, "commits" refer to individual CVS checkins, each of which establish a new version, adding a new leaf to the version dictionary for that file; "updates" describe the number of inserts or deletes required for each commit. Total statistics sum the number of lines (blocks) and kilobytes required to store all inserted lines across all versions, even after they have been removed from the file by later deletions.
We use these figures to evaluate the performance of a proof of possession under the DPDP I scheme: as described in Section 7, the cost of authenticating different versions of files within a directory hierarchy requires time and space complexity corresponding to the depth of the skip list hierarchy, and the width of each skip list encountered during the Prove procedure.
As in the previous evaluation, "Proof size, 99%" in Table 3 refers to the size of a response to 460 challenges over an entire repository (all directories, files, and versions). This figure shows that clients of an untrusted CVS server-even those storing none of the versioned resources locally-can query the server to prove possession of the repository using just a small fraction (1% to 5%) of the bandwidth required to download the entire repository. "Proof size and time per commit" refer to a proof sent by the server to prove that a single commit (made up of, on average, about a dozen updates) was performed successfully, representing the typical use case. These commit proofs are very small (9KB to 15KB) and fast to compute (around 1ms), rendering them practical even though they are required for each commit. Our experiments show that our DPDP scheme is efficient and practical for use in distributed applications.
